Objective Morality, and its impact on our intercultural landscape.

Cultural relativism: A sociological term meaning: judging a culture by their own standards, from their own perspective, as opposed to ethnocentrism, the act of judging another culture by your own culture’s standards.

Morality (as defined by Cambridge dictionary): a set of personal or social standards for good or bad behaviour and character.

• In this essay, I will be augmenting this definition slightly to reflect the topic being discussed. Whenever the word ‘morality’ is used, this is its meaning:
• A set of standards and expectations that determine whether an action should or should not occur, determined by the outcome of the action and the context surrounding it.

Subjective morality: the concept that there is no intrinsic, objective system of morality, outside of the moral systems and beliefs that humans determine.

Objective morality: a system of morality that exists beyond the moral expectations that our societies, cultures, religions and laws lay out — not necessarily “decreed” by any supernatural “deity” or force, nor unaffected by what occurs/the context around it.*

*this is an extremely relevant qualifier: often when people hear the phrase “objective morality”, they make one (or both) of two assumptions: firstly, that this system of morality must have been defined by a “supreme being” (a god of some description); and secondly, that objective morality is predetermined, unchangeable, and does not take into account developments in the world around us. Neither of these are necessary conditions of an objective system of morality. The second assumption is indicative of a strictly deontological system of morality, where certain actions are forbidden in all scenarios; supporters of the existence of objective morality often hamstring themselves by attempting to adhering to the criteria of deontology when arguing, which I will not be doing.

**”Developed” is a stand-in for the countries that most people would define as “first world”.

The question of the existence of an objective morality is not a new one. Since living creatures first became able to grasp concepts beyond their instinctual urges, we have been assigning moral values to actions; and ever since people began to imagine the existence of supernatural beings, we have been externalising the responsibility of our moral systems to these deities, whether they be the spirits of trees worshipped by ancient hunter-gatherers, or the Roman Catholic God. For thousands of years, humans have discussed morality and defined right and wrong with the perspective that there is a correct moral system that humans must adhere to, usually stemming from a religious figure.

Naturally, as the world grew more and more secular, and scientific advances demystified the natural world and left little room for religion to be a defining force in most (developed**) societies, the concept of objective morality has become harder and harder to defend. Clearly, our moral expectations have changed since the times of Socrates and Plato; indeed, between the fall of Ancient Greece and the rise of the Roman Empire, morality underwent endless facelifts. It has never been constant in how we define it, and our attempts to externalise its origin is pitifully nonsensical: despite what the Catholic Church claims, its definition of sin, vice, and virtue, were first formed and penned by a human, not Jesus Christ or his father.

I would like to posit an argument for a new form of objective morality, one that is not nearly so rigid as most. First, however, subjective morality must be discussed. If we are to accept (as most do) that living things are here not by divine intention, but due to a random series of cause and effect reactions that led to our existence, it seems to become clear that there can be no overarching, omnipresent set of moral expectations. Consequently, it seems to logically follow that humans define our own morality among each other, meaning there are over 7 billion differing moralities on the individual level, and millions of different moral systems on the cultural and societal level. Laws attempt to provide a cohesive baseline in societies, but are distinct from morality: there is no law decreeing that passersby with excess money must give it to the homeless man with no food, yet many moral systems would indicate that they should.

Subjective morality is often used to defend differences in cultural norms and traditions throughout the world; merely because I was raised in a certain culture with a certain moral system, does not mean that every other culture’s moral system is incorrect. To someone raised in a Catholic city in the southern states of the US, gay marriage and abortion would be considered immoral; this does not give this person the right to expect, bully, or force other cultures and societies to align with their moral preferences. One of the biggest criticisms of objective morality is that it often is used to justify a person or group of people’s efforts to forcibly change another culture’s system of morality and way of life (the Christian British Empire, the capitalist USA and communist USSR’s conflict over the control of various countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas during the Cold War, English colonists in Australia and their impact on the Indigenous communities).

The existence of an objective moral system does not necessitate or even allow for the forced suppression or colonisation of living beings in communities and cultures around the globe. Keep this in mind, it will be relevant soon. (humans can never know for certain that their moral system is correct, so it is never permissible to justify forcing their system on others with the argument “but we know better”).

My argument is that merely because there exists a near-infinite amount of different moral systems, doesn’t mean there isn’t a right answer to the question of morality. I believe that there is a moral system that is correct, even if it is not defined by some universal law or supernatural decree.

A few basic assumptions:

• Suffering (not just physical and emotional pain; suffering is defined as anything that has a negative impact on living beings, including lack of education, not allowing cultures to share their rich concepts and learn from each other, etc) is immoral.
• The reduction of suffering therefore must be moral, but only if in doing so it does not create more suffering than it prevents.
• Arguments A and B must exist in context, and must account for potential future consequences; the short-term suffering of an addict in rehab should not override the longer-term reduction of suffering, meaning that it is not moral to supply this patient with drugs to ease their short-term withdrawals, despite the fact that the act of giving the patient the drug they crave does not create much suffering in the short term, as it will harm them in the long run.

The place for debating these assumptions is not this essay; while there are many intriguing aspects of the philosophical debate of whether killing is bad, this piece is discussing morality in practical terms, and how it will affect the world around us. Metaphysical discussions about whether life holds any intrinsic value will not be broached here.

Even with the pre-determined baseline arguments for morality listed above, there is still infinite variation possible. However, just because there are infinite possibilities for moral systems doesn’t mean there isn’t a correct one. It follows from the key assumptions above that certain cultures around the world hold certain expectations or “moral” expectations that are, in fact, immoral (forced underage marriage, genital mutilation, expectations or societal rules that seriously restrict people’s actions based on an involuntary characteristic, such as gender, race, sexuality, appearance, etc). The question then becomes to what extent should those practices be interfered with by outsiders, a touchy subject given that (almost) every attempt to influence a culture’s moral system to change has been accompanied with violence, cruelty, and suppression of said culture. It is crucial to note, however, that one can still denounce certain practices in a culture without seeking to suppress the culture, or force it to change, or by renouncing the respect one has for it. Cultures have never been stagnant; they constantly change, adapting as its members unearth new discoveries, as stories are adapted and paraphrased with each telling, and as the culture shifts to align more with the views of society. Therefore, attempts to facilitate positive change within the culture in question by seeking to quell immoral traditions or expectations, can be morally permissible, with a few conditions:

• The person or people who are seeking to educate do so with the intention to accept whatever response they get to their efforts.
• The most that the person or people hope to do is demonstrate differing moral perspectives and provide new information to the citizens of the culture, allowing the culture to progress naturally forward with this new information; it is perfectly permissible to travel to a different country and give public talks on morality, and then depart. It would not be moral to travel to that country, give talks on how their moral system is inferior to one’s own, and then coerce/bribe/force people in that community to alter their way of life beyond what they would voluntarily.

Another factor of considerable relevance is understanding the context surrounding historical attempts by one culture to alter the moral system of another: the goal of these various moralising colonists was to replace the cultural system of their prey with their own, e.g. “civilising” native Australians by erasing their own religions, traditions, and moralities and entrenching Christianity as the fundamental, and only, culture. It is difficult to dispute the magnitude of difference between an attempt to augment one expectation within a culture with the intent of improving said culture’s moral system, and an attempt to entirely dominate a people by destroying the foundations of their society and enforcing one’s own moral system instead. One can enact the former while maintaining a stance of cultural relativism — it does not lead to the conclusion that you believe your culture to necessarily be morally superior; every culture and society has countless moral blind spots — it is important to remember that all nations that are a part of the UN have agreed to adhere to the International Bill of Rights, so unless you wish to condemn that bill as ethnocentric moralising, it follows that certain moral expectations are agreed by common consensus to supersede cultural norms. Whether countries follow these global rights is an issue usually addressed by the country’s actions being investigated and in some cases acted upon by the UN; would you consider this morally problematic as they are trying to alter certain practices within the culture that they view as immoral?

The distinction between, for example, a missionary seeking to convert another culture, and someone seeking to alter a sexist tradition in another culture, is that the former individual does not respect the culture itself: they hold the ethnocentric opinion that these people would be better off following their cultural systems, whereas the latter still wishes the culture to be distinct from any others, and just seeks to improve the quality of life of the people that live within it.

Following from this, we see the comparison of people trying to alter certain moral examples within a society with people wishing to eradicate or colonise a culture and its people becomes like comparing apples and football fields; the scale is wildly different, and the components of each are just as diverse.

Objective morality exists in a sense; while it defines what actions are good and bad regardless of whatever culture or society within which the actions occur, it is ever changing and evolving to adapt as the world it defines does. The existence of an objective moral system means that regardless of culture, location, social norms, some actions are just not okay, but also that as our world changes, these changes will have impacts on our moral systems to the point where something that was once abhorrent is now considered perfectly morally permissible, and vice versa.

Consider the following thought experiment, intended to clarify how an objective moral system can still rely on context and circumstance:

• In scenario 1, a healthy young woman of 25, who has committed no serious crimes and is no danger to herself or people around her, is injected with a fast-acting, painless poison while she is sleeping. Considering our key assumptions on what is moral discussed above, this killing would be considered immoral, as the woman is being deprived of her ability to live, experience the world, and fulfil her desires. (Another key assumption, that staying alive (provided you are not in extremely outlying circumstances) is favourable compared to your life ending, is being made here. Again, not a discussion I will have in this essay, but an intriguing conversation nonetheless).
• In scenario 2, all factors of the situation are the same save one: in this hypothetical universe, science has progressed to the point that it is possible to “resurrect” someone who has died, with no perceivable downsides — if the same woman is killed in the same way, and then resuscitated with this new method, her killing is no longer immoral.

Now we reach arguably the most important part of this argument for the existence of an objective moral system: our imperfection.

Humans are complex, and random. We don’t make decisions in our best interests, as our emotions and lack of ability to disconnect and be impartial in situations hampers our critical thinking. We are innately selfish, whether consciously and unconsciously so, and we find new experiences and concepts frightening (or at the very least, something to be wary of). These traits are born from countless millennia of genetic development, our instincts refining themselves to best protect us in immediate life or death situations — the example of our fight/flight/freeze response to immediate danger is a clear example — and our habits being enforced by the harsh heirarchies and lack of overarching support for the “little guy” in our societies. Basically, we are not the ideal moral creatures. We cannot know how to decipher a potential objective moral system; we don’t have the mental and theoretical tools to understand what perfect morality is. Even if we did, it is unreasonable to expect us as individuals to live our lives as extremely moral people.

So, despite the (arguable) existence of objective morality, we cannot pretend to know what it entails, and therefore are required to exercise considerable restraint when it comes to differing moral perspectives across the world. Cultural relativism becomes crucial in these situations: when judging a moral system different from your own, you should be prepared to ask yourself the following questions:

• How would I view their moral system if I was raised within it, rather than my current one?
• What circumstances could have led to their current moral and cultural systems that differ from the circumstances surrounding my own?
• Is there a way one can take these first two questions into consideration and still aim to alter or improve certain aspects of the culture’s moral code?

Finally, we must always look inward first. While I may have argued that it is not unjustifiable to attempt to alter other culture’s moral systems in the cases of clear immoral actions that cause notable suffering, we must try to alter the immoral expectations in our own culture before we move to others. Nothing reeks of moral hypocrisy more than a white man condemning practices of another culture while his own society doesn’t pay their workers a living wage.

In conclusion, an objective moral system could very likely exist, but that does not mean we as humans have any idea what it entails or possess the right to enforce it upon other people. Cultural relativism must be followed to a point, but certain practices within certain cultures should be condemned regardless of whether or not the person judging exists within or beyond that culture.